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This paper analyzes the role played by Fechner’s psychophysics—the new science
meant to measure sensation as a function of the stimulus—in the development of
Marburg Neo-Kantianism. It will show how Cohen, in the early 1870s, in
order to make sense of Kant’s obscure principle of the Anticipations of Perception,
resorted to psychophysics’ parlance of the relation between stimulus and sensation.
By the end of the decade, Cohen’s remarks encouraged the early ‘Cohen circle’
(Stadler, Elsas, Müller) to pursue what were often sophisticated analyses of
the problem of the measurability of sensation. This paper argues that in reaction
to these contributions, Cohen shifted his interests towards the history of the in-
finitesimal calculus in his controversial 1883 monograph, Das Princip der
Infinitesimal-Methode. This book, with its characteristic amalgam of tran-
scendental philosophy and history of science, paved the way to what, around
1900, would become the “Marburg school” (Natorp, Cassirer, Görland and
others). However, it also interrupted a promising discussion in Marburg on the
problem of measurability in science.
1. Introduction
In 1912, Ernst Cassirer (1912) contributed to the special issue of the Kant-
Studien that honored Hermann Cohen’s retirement—his mentor and teacher,
and the recognized founding father of the so-called ‘Marburg school’ of
Neo-Kantianism (Poma [1989] 1997). In the context of an otherwise rather
conventional presentation of Cohen’s interpretation of Kant, Cassirer made
a remark that is initially surprising. It is “anything but accurate,” he wrote,
to regard Cohen’s philosophy as focused “exclusively on the mathematical
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theory of nature,” (Cassirer 1912, p. 256) as is usually done. A reconstruc-
tion of the genesis of Cohen’s thought, Cassirer continued, would already
refute this interpretation. Actually, “[t]he conditions of the problem, as they
were presented to Cohen at that time [die Cohen vorfand], lay at least as
much in the critique of physiology as in the critique of physics” (1912,
p. 256).1 From the “concept of sensation,” Cassirer went on, Cohen was ini-
tially led to investigate “the [concept] of ‘stimulus’,” (1912, p. 256) which
was regarded only in the second instance as a possible object of physics. I
suspect that this allusion to the relation between sensation and stimulus,
made only in passing, might escape the attention of most readers. However,
Cassirer alluded to an over ten year debate initiated by Cohen and continued
by a small group of early sympathizers—a little “Cohen circle” as it might
be called, to distinguish it from what only later would become the “Marburg
school.” Surprisingly, this debate has been completely neglected by histo-
rians of Neo-Kantianism, despite being an important line in the develop-
ment of the history of 19th century philosophy and science.
At the beginning of the 1860s, the nearly sixty-year-old physicist
Gustav Theodor Fechner (1860) claimed to have established a new science,
which he called psychophysics. Psychophysics sought to measure sensation on
the basis of its functional dependency on the “stimulus,” and, at the same
time, to present in rigorous form the problem of the relation between the
mental and the physical. Starting from Ernst Heinrich Weber’s experimental
results (Weber 1834, 1846), Fechner suggested that infinitesimal increments
of sensation were directly proportional to infinitesimal increments in stimu-
lus and inversely proportional to the amount of the original stimulus. Thus,
the function relating sensation to the stimulus would be logarithmic (Fechner
1860, vol. 2, pp. 9–14). In the successive decades, a debate was sparked
among philosophers, psychologists, physicists, and mathematicians over
whether sensations could be measured at all (Heidelberger [1993] 2004;
Michell 1999). Many, if not most, of the writings of the members of the
Cohen circle—nearly forgotten figures like August Stadler, Adolf Elsas and
Ferdinand August Müller—were meant to contribute to this debate. These
sometimes-sophisticated analyses were in turn inspired by Cohen’s early
attempt to use psychophysics’ conceptual tools to make sense of some of
Kant’s obscure remarks about the intensive magnitude of sensation in the
Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
Michael Heidelberger, in his classic 1993 Fechner monograph (Heidelberger
[1993] 2004, Ch. 6), was the first to take the Marburg debate on psycho-
physics into consideration and to suggest its importance for the formation
of the early Cohen circle (Heidelberger [1993] 2004, p. 124f.). However,
1. Henceforth the emphasis in the original has been rendered as italics.
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Heidelberger’s contribution, which is “hidden” in a monumental investiga-
tion of Fechner’s work and its reception, seems to have completely escaped
the attention of historians of philosophy. The aim of this paper is to fill what
I think is a serious gap in the historical literature on Neo-Kantianism,
which has recently been enjoying a renewed interest, especially in the
English-speaking world (Beiser 2014; Makkreel and Luft 2009; Luft 2015).
Elsewhere (Giovanelli 2016), I have analyzed in detail the role played by
Cohen’s 1883 “unsuccessful” book on the history of the infinitesimal method,
Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode (Cohen 1883), in shaping some of the
fundamental tenets of the school (in particular the intimate relation between
transcendental philosophy and the history of science). In the present paper,
I aim to show that it was the early Marburg debate on psychophysics that,
in a sort of heterogony of ends, prompted Cohen’s interest in the history of
higher analysis. This paper is of course very much indebted to Heidelberger’s
path-breaking contributions. However, by considering the Marburg debate
on psychophysics from the perspective of the history of the Marburg school,
rather than of Fechner’s reception, I hope I will throw a different light on the
matter. In particular, in my opinion, there is a missing piece in Heidelberger’s
reconstruction of the puzzle: Kant’s principle of the Anticipations of
Perception (A, pp. 166–176; B, pp. 207–218). In my view, this is the key
element to understanding the entire debate. The Marburg interest in psycho-
physics arose from Cohen’s early attempt at providing a psychophysical inter-
pretation of Kant’s principle, and then faded away when Cohen became
convinced that this attempt had failed. It was at this point that he ventured
himself into a new interpretation exposed in Das Princip der Infinitesimal-
Methode. It was the stance towards Cohen’s “paradigm switch” that deter-
mined the Cohen circle’s internal dynamics, which, as we shall see, was more
turbulent than it appears in Heidelberger’s presentation.
The narrative structure of the paper will be as follows. In the early
1870s, Cohen, in order to make sense of Kant’s obscure principle of the
Anticipations of Perception, initially resorted to psychophysics’ parlance of
the relation between stimulus and sensation (sec. 1). The few remarks that
Cohen made on the subject encouraged his early followers (Stadler, Elsas
and Müller) to pursue an often-technical analysis of Fechner’s psycho-
physics (sec. 2). In turn, Cohen, inspired by these critiques, realized that
psychophysics was not the proper framework for understanding Kant’s
Anticipations of Perception, which, he claimed, should be interpreted
against the background of the history of the infinitesimal calculus (sec. 3).
On the one hand, Cohen’s infinitesimal turn divided the early Cohen circle
into those ready to follow his new course and those who were taken aback
by his unorthodox approach to the calculus (sec. 4). On the other hand,
Cohen’s Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode paved the way for the Marburg
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school’s interest in the historical fieri of science (Natorp 1912b). At the same
time, however, this new course abruptly interrupted a promising discussion
in Marburg on the issue of “measurability” in science, a discussion that
Cohen himself had somehow unwittingly inspired (sec. 5).
2. Anticipations of Perception and Psychophysics: Cohen and Stadler
In the first edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Cohen 1871), his first
Kant monograph, Cohen dedicates several lines to the principle of Antici-
pations of Perception, the second of the synthetic principles enumerated by
Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In the second 1787 edition of the
Kritik, the principle somewhat cryptically attributes an intensive magni-
tude to the realitas phaenomenon—the “real” that is the object of sensation.
In the first 1781 edition the wording was slightly different. Kant attri-
butes an intensive magnitude to the sensation and to the real that corre-
sponds to it (A, p. 166). Noticing the difference between these two
formulations of the principle, Cohen commented: “What is the real as an
object of simple sensation, as an intensive quantity, in antithesis to an
extensive?”: “it is the unity of the stimulus in which we objectify sensation”
(1871, pp. 215–16). Kant of course did not use the expression “unity of
the stimulus” (1871, p. 217). However, Cohen was convinced that Kant’s
insistence in the second edition of his opus magnus on the “real” that is the
object of sensation, rather than on sensation itself, was motivated by the
need to find an objective correlate of sensation: “the intention […] of clar-
ifying the real as a simple unity of the objectified stimulus seems to me to
be the reason for modifying this affirmation in the second edition” (1871,
p. 216).
The language of the “physiology of the senses” used by Cohen (1871, p. 215)
might not mean much to today’s Kant scholar. In contrast, Cohen’s insight
was enormously influential among his early acolytes, a point that is rarely
mentioned in the literature. Cohen’s readers at the time probably imme-
diately understood that Cohen’s parlance was a reference to Fechner’s con-
troversial attempt to measure the intensive magnitude of sensation in terms
of its functional relation to the stimulus (Fechner 1860). Similar wordings
can be found in Cohen’s previous “Herbartian” writings (1868, p. 420).
However, Cohen might have learned about this issue from Friedrich Albert
Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus (Lange 1866). Lange, by discussing the
relation between form and content in Kant’s philosophy, mentions Fechner’s
logarithmic formula for the relation between the sensation as the internal
content of consciousness, and the “external (physical) stimulus” (Lange 1866,
p. 251).
From 1870 to 1872 Lange was professor of inductive philosophy in
Zurich. It was one of his Zurich students, August Stadler (1850–1910), who
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took up Cohen’s insights a few years later. Lange himself had recommended
Stadler to Cohen, the latter of which being an unknown Privatdozent in Berlin
at the time (cf. Cohen 1910a). In Berlin, Stadler broadened his scientific
outlook by following the lectures of some of the great scientists of his time:
Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil Du Bois Reymond and Ernst Engel; in addi-
tion, he attended Cohen’s small seminar on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(Cohen to Lange, May 14, 1873; Lange 1968, p. 372). This seminar deeply
influenced him. At the end of 1873, Stadler finished writing a short but
influential monograph on Kant’s teleology (Stadler 1874), and by October
1875 had already finished a second book, in which he developed Cohen’s
insight on the transcendental meaning of the a priori (Stadler 1876). Cohen,
who in the meantime had succeeded the prematurely deceased Lange in
Marburg, immediately elaborated on Stadler’s contributions in his 1876/77
book on Kant’s ethics (Cohen 1877).
In his 1876 book, Stadler took an original stance towards Kant’s Antici-
pations of Perception. Stadler, like Cohen, also read Kant’s second principle
as a claim about the psychology of sensation. However, Stadler was not con-
vinced of the success of Kant’s attempt to deduce a priori the continuity of
the degree of sensation. Thus, he preferred to reformulate Kant’s second
principle as what he called the “principle of material connection” (Prinzip
der materiellen Verknüpfung) (Stadler 1876, Ch. VIII). The principle indicates
as an a priori condition the weaker claim that “all sensations must possess
an intensive magnitude” (Stadler 1876, p. 65). All sensations must be “over
the zero-point of consciousness” (Stadler 1876, p. 65) (that is there are
no negative sensations), otherwise the succession of sensations would be
interrupted; as a consequence, the unity and identity of consciousness
would be compromised and no objectively valid experience would be pos-
sible. “Beyond this,” Stadler pointed out, Kant took a further step “that I
cannot follow” (1876, p. 145). Kant claimed that the increase and decrease
of the intensive magnitude of sensation is continuous. Stadler “tried in vain
to find a transcendental reason” for this claim, but he had to conclude that
“the Kritik leaves it unproven” (1876, p. 145). Whether or not the degree of
sensation varies continuously can at most be decided a posteriori, “through
the investigation of the single sensations” (1876, p. 72). However, Stadler
would soon show that empirical investigations about sensations, far from
supporting Kant’s claim, actually refuted it.
At the time, nearly two decades after the publication of the Elemente der
Psychophysik, the debate about Fechner’s result, that physical and subjective
intensity are related by a logarithmic function, was alive as ever. In 1877,
Fechner published In Sachen der Psychophysik (1877), in which he defended
himself from his numerous and often renowned critics: Hermann von
Helmholtz (1867), Ernst Mach (1863), Joseph Plateau (1872), Joseph
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Delbœuf (1873), Ewald Hering (1875), Franz Brentano (1874) and others.
Fechner’s attempt to measure sensation was based precisely on the assump-
tion that the degree of sensation varies continuously along with the con-
tinuous variation of the stimulus. It was this assumption that Stadler
wanted to challenge, which, he claimed, Fechner’s opponents had not called
into question. In February 1878, Stadler finished a brief paper entitled
“Über die Ableitung des Psychophysischen Gesetzes,” which was published
in Philosophische Monatshefte in the same year (Stadler 1878). In contrast to,
e.g., Delbœuf (1878), Stadler did not want to deny the quantitative aspect
of sensation, but rather to challenge the empirical adequacy of Fechner’s
logarithmic formula. We shall roughly follow Stadler’s derivation of the lat-
ter. Although Stadler’s procedure is similar though not identical to Fechner’s,
it remained the model of similar derivations presented by the Marburg group.
Throughout this paper, I will follow Stadler (who in turn follows Fechner
himself ) and indicate the variable corresponding to sensation with γ, and
that corresponding to the stimulus with β.
Initially Fechner introduced his formula speculatively in the second
Appendix of his Zend-Avesta (Fechner 1851, pp. 373–86; cf. Scheerer
1987). However, later, in his Elemente der Psychophysik (Fechner 1860), he
presented it as based on Weber’s experimental results, in particular those
concerning the sensation of weight and touch (Weber 1834, 1846). On
the basis of numerous trials on pairwise comparisons of weights, Weber
found that subjects do not perceive the absolute difference between them
but the ratio of difference to the initial weight. If a one-ounce weight is
placed in our hand, we can easily perceive it; however, if two weights of,
say, 32 and 33 ounces are compared, we do not perceive the one-ounce dif-
ference between them; the ratio 1/33 is too small to be discerned. The same
can be said for the difference between eye-estimated lengths, sound pitches,
etc. Weber’s findings can be summarized in the formula:
Δβ
β
¼ c (i)
The constant c depends on the different senses (touch, hearing, etc). In this
formulation of Weber’s results, there is no mention of sensation. In order to
establish a functional relation between sensation and stimulus, Fechner
made a further assumption. He postulated that the “difference sensation”
(Unterschiedsemempfindung) or “contrast sensation” (Contrastempfindung)—which
arises when the difference of two stimuli becomes “just noticeable”—is
proportional to the “sensation difference” (Empfindungsunterschied ), the dif-
ference between the two corresponding sensations (Fechner 1860, vol. 2,
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p. 85). This assumption is nothing but the psychophysical analogon of the
definition of equal temperature differences in terms of equal volumes of
expansion in the theory of heat (Tannery 1875a, 1875b). To put it more
precisely: if the just-noticeable stimulus-increase with respect to the original
stimulus is constant Δβ / β = c, then the corresponding “difference sensation”
is constant Δγ = c0. Setting c = kc0, the “just-noticeable differences” between
stimuli ( j.n.d.) might be used as a unit of measurement; the number of
sensation differences Δγ between two stimuli is k times the number of j.n.d.
Δβ / β between them. In this way one can write Weber’s experimental find-
ings in the form of a functional relation between stimulus and sensation:
Δγ ¼ kΔβ
β
where k ¼ c
0
c
(ii)
Notice that this equation does not appear in Fechner’s writings (see
below in sec. 3). In Stadler’s reconstruction, however, Fechner started from
this equation and postulated that it is valid for every change of sensation,
however small; that is, it is also valid for the so-called “unconscious sen-
sations” that are caused by a stimulus which is not sufficient to raise them
to consciousness (e.g., the increase from 32 to 33 ounces). Fechner ap-
pealed to what he called an “a priori valid mathematical auxiliary principle
[Hülfsprincip]” (Fechner 1860, p. 40): what is true for finite differences
ought to also be true in the limit. Then he substituted the finite increments
Δβ and Δγ with the infinitesimally small increments dβ and dγ. The simple
relation (ii) between two units of measure turned into an informative dif-
ferential equation, the so-called Fundamentalformel:
dγ ¼ k dβ
β
(iii)
The next step was to derive an integral formula containing an expression
for the measurement of sensation. This is a matter of more or less elementary
differential and integral calculus. One first calculates the indefinite integral
of eq. (iii) (i.e., without upper and lower limits):
Z
dγ ¼
Z
k
dβ
β
þ Const (iv)
By consulting a table of integrals one can easily find that the integral of
a fraction whose numerator is the differential of the denominator is the
293Perspectives on Science
natural logarithm (that is, a logarithm with base e = 2.7182 …) of the
denominator:
γ ¼ k lnβþ Const (v)
To eliminate the constant of integration one evaluates the integral be-
tween definite limits. Fechner chooses as the lower limit γ = 0, where the
sensation begins (that is it becomes conscious) and disappears and the
correspondent β0, that is, the threshold of stimulus below which there is
no perception:
Z γ
γ0
dγ ¼
Z β
β0
k
dβ
β
(vi)
The sensation γ—or more precisely the difference of two sensations γ0 − γ
which corresponds to the differences of two stimuli β − β0—can be measured
as the definite integral, that is, as a summation of infinitesimally small
sensation increments dγ which corresponds to the summation of infinitely
small stimuli increments dβ. According to eq. (v) this is of course equivalent
to γ − γ0 = lnβ − lnβ0. For a well-known logarithmic identity, the differ-
ence of the logarithms of two numbers is the logarithm of their ratio. Thus
Fechner’s final equation is the following:
γ ¼ k ln β
β0
(vii)
Sensation γ is not simply the logarithm of the stimulus β, but of the
latter expressed in terms of its threshold value β0, the first unit stimulus,
from which the zero point where the sensation begins and disappears
(Fechner 1860, vol. 2, p. 13). After the initial value (β0) and the unit of
measurement (β0 = 1) have been specified, sensation can then be measured
as an accumulation of j.n.d. Thus, Fechner’s formula is both a law of nature
and a measurement formula at the same time (cf. Heidelberger [1993]
2004, p. 206; Heidelberger 1993).
After roughly presenting Fechner’s derivation in this way, Stadler pointed
to a simple but serious conceptual difficulty that it entails. According to
Weber’s findings, if one imagines the stimulus gradually increasing from
a weight of, say, 32 ounces to twice that, then not all of the infinite possible
values between 32 and 64 ounces can be perceived, rather only those for
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which the eq. (i) or Δβ = cβ holds. We can perceive the difference between,
say, 32 and 42 ounces, but not between 32 and 33 ounces: “not every Δβ
corresponds to a variation of the sensation, rather Δγ remains zero for all values >
c ⋅ β ” (Stadler 1878, p. 219). When Fechner, relying on his mathematical
auxiliary principle, introduced eq. (iii)—that is, he substituted finite differ-
ences Δβ and Δγ with infinitesimally small ones dβ and dγ—he contra-
dicted Weber’s results rather than building on them.
Of course this objection is valid only if one equates sensation with con-
scious sensations, as Stadler explicitly does. In this case one can claim that
Weber’s experiments have shown that no sensation change Δγ corresponds
to a very small stimulus variation Δβ = dβ: “Weber’s law is an empirical
law and it is valid only for the real, empirically given sensations, and not
so-called unconscious ones” (Stadler 1878, p. 220). As a consequence, we
are not allowed to “represent the reciprocal correlation of the stimulus and
of the sensation through a continuous function or a curve” (1878, p. 220).
In Fechner’s conception, stimulus and sensation are related by the natural
exponential function γ = eβ. Such a function can be plotted on a Cartesian
coordinate system by a smooth curve (looking like half a parabola) which
increases dramatically over its domain, since γ increases faster as β increases:
equal units on a sensation scale correspond to progressively greater units
on an external physical scale. However, according to Weber’s findings, if
we represent a small variation of the stimulus (Δβ < c) on the x-axis, then
no variation of the sensation (Δγ) would correspond on the y-axis: “The
sensation progression,” in Stadler’s words, “then has the form of a stair with
steps of increasing width” (1878, p. 220).
“The essence of the relation between Δβ and Δγ,” as Stadler summa-
rized his critique of psychophysics, “is discontinuity. The logarithmic
curves, with which one attempts to represent the psycho-physical law, lack
empirical truth” (1878, p. 223). However one might judge this technical
result, its philosophical implications seem hard to fathom at first. How-
ever, the philosophical intent of Stadler’s critique of Fechner became more
perspicuous in a paper Stadler finished in June of 1880 and published in
the same year in the Philosophische Monatshefte, “Das Gesetz der Stetigkeit
bei Kant” (Stadler 1880). Stadler showed that Kant had an ambiguous
attitude on the question of the continuity of the intensive magnitude. In
the Anticipations of Perception, Kant claims that the intensive magnitude
of sensation is continuous only in the weak sense, that between every degree
and nothing, one can always think of another arbitrary possible smaller
degree. Nothing can be said about the continuous increasing or decreasing
of the variation of degree, which is an empirical question (B, pp. 212–13).
However, in the Beweis of the second Analogy of Experience, Kant seems
to defend the stronger claim, that the intensive magnitude of sensation
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arises from 0 to a certain degree in a continuous manner, running through all
actual intermediate degrees (B, pp. 255–56).
At first sight, Stadler’s paper seems to lack theoretical ambition, and it
is based on a detailed textual analysis of Kant’s passages on continuity.
However, though “only in passing,” he does note “that modern psychology
has not offered any reason to reshape Kant’s concept of the degree of sen-
sation” (Stadler 1880, p. 585). Modern psychophysics does not permit any
a posteriori demonstration of what Kant attempted in vain to demonstrate
a priori. Psychophysics postulates that the process of the emergence of a
sensation runs through all intermediate degrees, even if this passage is so
rapid that it remains unnoticed. However—and this was the result of
Stadler’s 1878 paper—this postulate, far from being valid a priori as Fechner
claimed, can probably be proven wrong a posteriori: “as far as intensity is
concerned, in my opinion, psycho-physical research has instead shown the
discontinuity in psychical transition in relation to the continuous growth
of the stimulus” (Stadler 1880, pp. 585–6). Experience seems to show that
the stimulus, e.g., a weight, can be increased to a certain degree without
causing any change in the corresponding conscious sensation.
Cohen seems to have immediately appreciated Stadler’s result. In a letter
to Stadler on February 24, 1881 Cohen claimed that he now “fully agreed”
with his “‘Stetigkeit’” (that is, Stadler 1880). However, he added: “I have out-
lined a formulation of the Anticipation in which your previous concerns seem
to be acknowledged and at the same time eliminated” (Cohen to Stadler,
February 24, 1881; Cohen 2015, pp. 128–9; my emphasis). This only re-
cently published letter is central to my account. It shows that a fundamental
“paradigm shift” happened at this point. On the one hand, Cohen recognized
that Stadler’s objections were justified against Kant’s a priori deduction of
the continuity of the degree of sensation. On the other hand, one can surmise
that at that time Cohen probably started to realize that Kant’s Anticipations
of Perception should be understood from a quite different perspective, out-
side the framework of psychophysics. We do not have further information
on what exactly Cohen had in mind. His next letter to Stadler is dated
months later in October and includes the first mention of “our new
Privatdozent Dr. Natorp”; in particular, Cohen announced the latter’s new
writing “which is thorough a[nd] clear” (Cohen to Stadler, October 30,
1881; Cohen 2015, p. 131). Paul Natorp’s habilitation thesis on Descartes
(later published as Natorp 1882a) had just been accepted and he had given
his inaugural lecture on Leibniz a few days earlier (Natorp 1881). Natorp’s
early works in Marburg revealed that Cohen was reorienting the interests of
his circle towards the “prehistory of criticism” and its connection to the his-
tory of science (Natorp 1882b, 1882c). In particular, Cohen might have al-
ready realized that the Anticipations of Perception should be understood not
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in the context of the epistemology of empirical psychology, but by investi-
gating the historical roots of Kant’s principle in the development of modern
mathematics and physics.
3. Elsas, Müller and the Early Cohen Circle in Marburg
That Cohen initially attempted to interpret Kant’s second principle against
the background of Fechner’s psychophysics might surprise today’s Kant
scholars. However, this approach was part of a vast research program that
Cohen put forward just after he succeeded the deceased Lange in Marburg,
becoming the first Jewish philosophy full professor at a German university.
According to the guideline of the Prussian Kultusministerium, the philosophy
faculty in Marburg used to offer scientific Preisaufgaben (essay prizes) with
the intent of supporting students (Sieg 1994, p. 130). The call for papers
launched by Cohen for the 1880/1881 prize (cf. Holzhey 1986, vol.1,
p. 381) required the candidate to “[e]xplain Kant’s mathematical principles”;
the first principle, the Axioms of Intuition with reference to “the new science
of space,” that is, non-Euclidean geometry; “the second principle,” the Antici-
pations of Perception, “should be evaluated with respect to the problem of psycho-
physics” (cited in Holzhey 1986, vol.1, p. 382; my emphasis).
The recipient of the prize was the physicist Adolf Elsas (1855–1895), who,
after his dissertation written under Helmholtz’s guidance in Berlin (Elsas
1881), was working as an assistant at the Marburg physical-mathematical
institute. In his referee report, Cohen praised Elsas’ secure knowledge of
Kant’s philosophy (Sieg 1994, p. 131). Concerning the treatment of Kant’s
first principle, Cohen appreciated Elsas’ ability to grasp the philosophical
implications of “the Riemmann-Helmholtz speculations” beyond technicali-
ties; with regard to the second principle, Cohen recognized that Elsas pre-
sented “the correct point of view for the appreciation of the psychophysical
problem” (Holzhey 1986, p. 23n86).
The question of the measurability of psychical magnitudes was hotly
debated among philosophers at that time. An influential scholar like the
great historian of Greek philosophy (and proto-neo-Kantian) Eduard Zeller,
had just published a discussion of the issue in the proceedings of the Prussian
Academy of Science (Zeller 1881). The dissertation of Ferdinand August
Müller (1858–1888), of which Cohen was the main supervisor, further tes-
tifies that this was one of the main philosophical concerns in Marburg. In his
Gutachten, Cohen emphasized that, after Stadler’s technical objection against
Fechner’s law, Müller was able to show “that in the very problem of estab-
lishing a functional relation between stimulus and sensation there is an
epistemological mistake” (Holzhey 1986, vol.1, p. 22).
In October 1881, Müller finished transforming his dissertation into the
booklet Das Axiom der Psychophysik (Müller 1882). The title refers to the fact
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that Müller distinguished the “axiom of psychophysics,” that is, Fechner’s
claim that there is a functional relationship between stimulus and sensation,
and the “problem of psychophysics,” the search for the particular form that
such a functional relationship actually assumes (e.g., logarithmic law, power
law, etc.). Instead of attacking Fechner’s solution of the problem as Stadler
had done, Müller wanted to strike the heart of Fechner’s enterprise by ques-
tioning the very idea that a functional relationship exists at all.
Müller recognized the importance of Stadler’s critique of Fechner’s law.
“Such a sharp objection,” he wrote “would alone be capable of overthrow-
ing Fechner’s entire construction of formulas [Formelgebäude]” (Müller
1882, p. 23), if the latter were based exclusively on Weber’s result, that
is, only on the “method of just-noticeable differences”. However, Müller
argued, “[t]his is not the case” (Müller 1882, p. 23). Beyond the experi-
ments that concern the just-noticeable differences, one must take into
account the “method of more-than-noticeable differences,” or the method
of bisection. Müller showed that Delbœuf’s (1873) repetition of Joseph
Plateau’s (1872) experiments on color differences allow dividing an initial
interval between two largely different perceived magnitudes of a sensation
into equal subintervals. Once equally-appearing intervals are defined, accord-
ing to Müller, Fechner could introduce the hypothesis expressed by Weber’s
fraction (ii). Müller argued that if one accepts this hypothesis, as Stadler did,
then “the passage to the fundamental formula containing the infinitely small
values dβ and dγ is irreproachable” (Müller 1882, p. 25).
Müller’s defense of Fechner’s derivation (see however Heidelberger [1993]
2004, p. 215) was of course meant to strategically shift the attention to a
more fundamental question. The shortcomings of psychophysics are not
physical-mathematical, but, as Müller put it, “transcendental.”
Müller uses the term transcendental according to the interpretation that
Cohen had laid down a few years earlier in the first part of his book on Kant’s
ethics (Cohen 1877). As is well known, in Cohen’s view, Kant’s transcen-
dental method proceeds bottom-up from the fact of the mathematical science
of nature as it is historically given in the “printed books,” to the conditions of
its possibility (cf. Cohen 1877, p. 77). The same approach must be applied
to psychophysics. Quantitative psychologists assumed as a fact that the
psychological attributes that they aspired to measure are quantitative. How-
ever, this alleged fact must be transformed into a “problem”, and its possi-
bility must be carefully evaluated.
Müller’s considerations, unfortunately, presuppose that the reader has
already bought into quite a lot of Kant’s philosophy. In particular, not sur-
prisingly, Cohen’s early interpretation of the Anticipations of Perception
plays a major part in Müller’s line of argument. Müller conceded that Kant’s
two formulations of the principle are confusing to say the least. Does Kant
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claim that sensation has intensive magnitude, or the real, which is the object
of sensation, or both? “The relations between sensation and the real, which
corresponds to it in the object, is not expressed with full clarity” (Müller
1882, p. 51). In Müller’s view, Cohen had made a fundamental step toward
solving the riddle: “by defining the real that corresponds to sensation in the
object as ‘stimulus’, Cohen developed in a highly significant way Kant’s
doctrine of the intensive magnitudes” (Müller 1882, p. 55). On the one hand,
Cohen obtained a hermeneutic elucidation of Kant’s different formulation
of the Anticipations of Perception in the two editions of the Kritik der reinen
Vernunft; on the other hand, he provided an epistemological clarification of
the ambiguous notion of stimulus. The stimulus does not arouse or cause
sensation, the stimulus is the object of sensation or it is the objectified sen-
sation (Müller 1882, p. 53). The main consequence of Cohen’s approach, in
Müller’s view, is that it is not the sensation that has intensive magnitude,
nor the sensation and the stimulus, but only the stimulus.
According to Müller, “physics measures intensive magnitudes and it is
therefore the task of physics to measure the magnitude of the stimulus”
(Müller 1882, p. 55). Using a Bunsen’s grease-spot photometer, for
instance, one can establish that the illuminance of the photometer screen
due to the source S located a distance d from the photometer is equal to the
illuminance of the screen due to the source S 0 located a distance d 0 from the
screen when the grease spot on the photometer’s screen becomes invisible
(S:d2 = S 0:d 02). After choosing a luminous intensity of a standard candle
(Normalkerze) as a unit, it is possible to construct the luminous intensity
scale with equally spaced units along the scale. Then one can establish
“how many standard candles at the same distance one would need to obtain
the same effect as the light that we want to measure” (Müller 1882, p. 54).
Using a Kantian terminology (B, pp. 201n), Müller claimed that intensive
magnitudes can be measured through a coalition of parts, rather than through
aggregation as in the case of extensive magnitudes (Müller 1882, p. 54).
In Müller’s reconstruction, Fechner attempted to achieve something anal-
ogous for the intensity of sensation. As we have mentioned, the trick was to
postulate that the difference sensation or contrast sensation (Contrastempfindung)
for two stimuli (the just-noticeable relative increase in stimulus), was pro-
portional to the sensation difference (Empfindungsunterschied) (the difference
between the two corresponding sensations). However, Müller objected, this
has the “absurd” implication that equal stimuli would produce no sensation
(Müller 1882, p. 106); but even if one sets aside this issue, there is still no
proof that the proportionality postulated by Fechner holds (Müller 1882,
p. 18). However, without this assumption sensation intensities cannot be
transformed into a class of measurable intensities. Instead of speaking of
contrast sensations that vary according to their intensity, Müller concluded,
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we can at most speak of contrast feelings (Contrastgefühle) that vary according
to their character (Müller 1882, pp. IV, 104, 106). In other terms, the equal-
ity and difference among, say, luminosities can be organized only in a nom-
inal scale assigning different names to different types of contrast feelings (say,
dark, shadowy, bright, luminescent, etc.; cf. Philippi 1883, p. 585ff. See
Müller 1882, pp. 106–115, for more sophisticated examples).
Thus, contrary to Fechner’s ambitions, Müller believed himself to have
shown that “sensation cannot be expressed in numbers at all,” i.e., it cannot
be measured (Müller 1882, p. 58). The stimulus can be measured, but one
can speak of the magnitude of sensation only in a figurative sense. As a
consequence, no functional relationship can be established between them.
Fechner’s indirect scaling method, in which the sensation differences are
measured by putting j.n.d in a row between stimuli becomes powerless
(Müller 1882, p. 58). The conclusion is of course that the axiom of psycho-
physics, the very claim that a functional relationship exists between the
magnitude of sensation and the magnitude of the stimulus, is flawed: “sen-
sation is not a function of the stimulus, but the stimulus is the object of
sensation” (Müller 1882, p. 56).
Müller’s epistemological reflections constitute only a relatively small por-
tion of the book. The latter includes further detailed analyses of Weber’s and
Charles Delezenne’s (1826) experiments (II.1 and II.2), of Helmholtz’s (1877)
analysis of sound sensations (II.3–5), of Georg Elias Müller’s (1878) devel-
opment of the right or wrong cases method (III.1), Delbœuf ’s (1873)
measurement of fatigue (III.2), and Hering’s (1875) work on spatial and
temporal sensations (III.1). This material cannot be considered here. What
is relevant in this context is that Müller displayed a solid technical knowledge
of the topic. Thus, Fechner himself took the time to reply to the “mathemat-
ically as well as philosophically trained author” (Fechner 1882, p. 324).
In 1882, Fechner published Revision der Hauptpuncte der Psychophysik
(Fechner 1882), a newly articulated defense of psychophysics against an
apparently never-ending series of new critics, including several philoso-
phers like Zeller (1881, 1882) and Johannes von Kries (1882). If Zeller
insisted that sensation magnitudes cannot be measured in practice, von Kries
thought that they cannot be measured in principle; Müller, as we have
seen, raised the more radical “quantity objection” that there are no sen-
sation magnitudes at all (cf., e.g., Michell 1999, p. 40ff.). Against Müller’s
argument “from Kantian principles” (Fechner 1882, p. 325), Fechner pointed
out that no one can deny that sensations of the same type (light, acoustic,
etc.) can be said to become stronger or weaker. Müller can regard contrast
sensations or sensation differences as mere contrast feelings, if he wants to.
However, Fechner believed himself to have shown that if one defines sensa-
tion differences as proportional to “difference sensations,” one can achieve
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measurements that are empirically correct. “What should I care about
Kantian definitions” (Fechner 1882, p. 325), he concluded.2 Müller is correct
in claiming that quantities can be compared only via a unit of measure: “and
exactly in this way my measurement formula measures sensation, even if
not directly, but through the mediation of its functional relations with the
stimuli” (Fechner 1882, p. 326).
In his review of Müller’s book, Elsas (1883a)—who in the meantime
had become Privatdozent in Marburg (Elsas 1882)—defends his Marburg
colleague on this point. If sensation intensities are ordinal (weaker and
stronger), this does not mean that they are measurable, that a certain sen-
sation is five or six times stronger than another one. Neither this measur-
ability of a quantity can be inferred from the fact that it is set in functional
relation to a measurable quantity. For instance, the welfare of a nation
depends, say, on its morality (Sittlichkeit); if one concedes that the former
is measurable, this does not mean that the latter is too (Elsas 1883a,
pp. 130–31). Fechner’s objection to Müller, according to Elsas, reveals that
the problem was much deeper. Fechner and his followers should undertake
a serious discussion to establish what a “measurable magnitude” is in general
(1883a, p. 131). Physics could be successful for a long time without raising
this question, but empirical psychology made an epistemological analysis of
the issue unavoidable.
Elsas’s review is worth mentioning because it reveals the background
against which this issue was understood within the Cohen circle. According
to Elsas—who was probably summarizing the results of his prize essay—
Kant’s transcendental question about the possibility of mathematics and
physics should be extended to the new sciences that were gaining ground
in the second half of the 19th century. “Is metageometry, is psychophysics a
possible science?” (Elsas 1883a, p. 127). The issue, as Cohen has shown, is
not a physio-psychological one; neither the origin of the representation of
space nor the organization of our sensibility are at stake. The question is,
“on which transcendental foundations (that is, on which conditions making
the knowledge possible) is the necessity of mathematical knowledge based?”
Müller, embracing “Cohen’s conception of the transcendental” (Elsas 1883a,
p. 127), has ventured to submit psychophysics to such a critical investigation.
In mathematics and physics we establish functional relationships among
magnitudes. The stimulus is clearly a magnitude that can be measured.
“Can the sensation also be measured? Yes or no? The answer to this simple
question decides the possibility of psychophysics” (Elsas 1883a, p. 130).
Despite providing an overall positive review of the book, Elsas however did
2. For the importance of Fechner’s answer to Müller, cf. Heidelberger [1993] 2004,
p. 240.
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not fully agree with Müller’s philosophical conclusions. Elsas, like Müller,
subscribed to Cohen’s identification of Kant’s “real which corresponds to
sensation” with the stimulus. However, Elsas denied that one can attribute
an intensive magnitude to the stimulus: “Physics measures intensities only as
extensive magnitudes; the intensity of a physical phenomenon, e.g., of
sound, of a light source, of a force is never an intensive magnitude” (1883a,
p. 133). Intensive magnitudes are measurable only indirectly through their
extensive effects.3
4. Cohen: From Psychophysics to the History of the Infinitesimal Method
When Elsas published his review of Müller’s book, Cohen had already
come to the conclusion that his interpretation of the Anticipations of
Perception, in which the real was identified with the stimulus of psycho-
physics, was not satisfying. Psychophysics was simply not the right frame-
work for making sense of Kant’s Anticipations of Perception. As we have
mentioned, at the beginning of 1881, Cohen wrote to Stadler that he
envisaged a way to acknowledge, and at the same time overcome, the latter’s
objection that, contrary to Kant’s claim, the degree of sensation probably var-
ies discontinuously. The most reliable, though indirect, source at our disposal
for concretely understanding what Cohen had in mind is probably Stadler’s
then-new monograph, Kants Theorie der Materie (Stadler 1883)—possibly the
first monograph on Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft
(Kant 1786).
Stadler still fully works within the framework built by Cohen and dis-
cussed by the early Cohen circle. As Stadler writes, “Cohen, very happily,
called ‘stimulus’ the objective correlate of the intensive magnitude” (1883,
p. 60). The magnitude that corresponds to the stimulus of the intensive
magnitude of sensation would thus be called the “magnitude of the stim-
ulus” (1883, p. 60). Stadler agreed with Müller that “only the stimulus can
be measured, not sensation”; however, this did not mean that “intensive mag-
nitude can only be attributed to the stimulus,” as Müller claimed (Stadler
1883, p. 248n24). For Stadler, only sensation has intensive magnitude,
but this is an internal psychological determination, which “in its own nature
is not measurable” (Stadler 1883, p. 61). Stadler agreed with Elsas that in-
tensive magnitudes are measurable only through their causal product of
extensive ones.
Stadler attempted to apply these conceptual tools to Kant’s work, giving
of a sort of psychophysical interpretation of some of the key elements of his
philosophy. Kant’s Gegebenwerden and the Afficirtwerden can be interpreted
3. This is, by the way, a quite Kantian point of view, see, e.g. Ak., 18:322; 28:425.
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as, in a first approximation, the “representation of the dependence of the
change of sensation on the outside” (Stadler 1883, p. 53); more precisely
this dependence—“which today one would call psychophysical” (1883,
p. 58)—means “the emergence of a degree of consciousness, an intensive
magnitude” (1883, p. 59). The objective correlate of the intensive magni-
tude, as suggested by Cohen, is the stimulus. In Stadler’s view, the stimulus
of sensation should ultimately be thought of as motion. This is what Kant
meant when he claimed that the object of the external senses must be
motion “because only thereby [through motion] can these senses be affected”
(Ak., vol. 4, p. 477). The differences between sense qualities should be ulti-
mately dissolved in the differences between motions. In Stadler’s reading, this
is nothing but “the principle of physiology that all external stimuli of the
sensations must be motions” (1883, p. 8), which, through the peripheral
nervous system are passed to the central nervous system (cf. Stadler 1878,
p. 223; see also Wundt 1874, p. 277).
Stadler notices further that, in the Beweis of the Anticipations of Percep-
tion, Kant used the expression “moment” to indicate the “reality as cause”
and, in particular, as the “cause of sensation,” as something that exerts an
influence on the senses (B, p. 211). “Moment” is for Kant the moment of
acceleration, an infinitely small variation of velocity. According to Stadler,
the term moment reveals that what Kant called “‘influence on the senses’,
the ‘stimulus’” (1883, p. 60) is nothing but the effect on what in physics
we call force. The “moment is the magnitude of the force that corresponds to
the intensive magnitude of the sensation” (1883, p. 60). The magnitude of
the force and intensive magnitude are correlated, but not identical. Force
can be measured only through its extensive effects. The intensive magnitude
is given in consciousness, it is a “subjective evaluation” of the stimulus,
and cannot be measured (Stadler 1883, p. 61).
Stadler conceded that there are passages where Kant seems to attribute
intensive magnitude not to sensation, but to physical determinations like
velocity (cf. Ak., vol. 4, p. 540–41). However, he claimed, one should re-
sist confusing this intensive magnitude with the intensive magnitude of
sensation. According to Stadler, Kant “did not want to identify it [the
intensive magnitude of velocity] at all with the intensive magnitude, which
corresponds to reality” (1883, p. 37; in the sense of the category of reality).
The definition of the velocity as an intensive magnitude, Stadler pointed
out, was only an analogy used to emphasize that the magnitude of velocity
is not composed of parts, as the magnitude of space and time is.
Stadler took some pains to interpret away the passages that could sup-
port the opposite reading. E.g., he comments on Kant’s reflection with
the title ‘Über das Moment der Geschwindigkeit im Anfangsaugenblick des Falls’
(Ak.,vol. 14: Refl. 67; 1788–1791). Here Kant attributes an intensive
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magnitude to the moment of velocity—that is, the tendency to fall down-
ward at the beginning of a falling motion—and conceives of the finite motion
as a summation of infinitely many “moments” (Ak., vol. 14, p. 495; Refl. 67).
Stadler warned that one should not try to read passages like these as Kant’s
attempt to provide a foundation for the “objective validity of the differential
calculus” (1883, p. 39). Interpreters committed to such a reading “would
be in contradiction with the view that Kant expressed of the infinitesimal
method” (1883, p. 39). In general, in Kant’s work, continuity means infinite
possibility of division, not composition from actual, though infinitely small
parts. Stadler concludes polemically that, “those who make the intensive
magnitude correspond with the differential confuse the form with the con-
tent” (1883, p. 39).
Although Stadler never mentioned Cohen explicitly, Cohen himself later
read this last claim in particular as being directed towards his upcoming book
(Cohen 1910a). Stadler’s monograph was finished in March (Stadler 1883,
p. IV). According to Cohen’s later recollections, Stadler stayed in Marburg
in the summer of 1883 while Cohen was working on his Das Princip der
Infinitesimal-Methode (Cohen 1883). The Vorwort of Cohen’s book is dated
August 1883 (Cohen 1883), but the book was sent to print only in mid-
October (Cohen to Natorp, September 27, 1883; CN, Br. 1, 148). Reading
the drafts of their books, Stadler and Cohen probably realized that one of
them put forward precisely what the other vehemently rejected. Edited by
that time, Cohen had completely abandoned the framework of psycho-
physics, which had enjoyed so much success among his acolytes. He became
convinced that Kant’s second principle could be understood precisely by
looking at the connection between the concepts of moment, intensive mag-
nitude and reality, which was suggested by the Kant passages mentioned
by Stadler. According to Cohen, by establishing this connection, Kant had
expressed philosophically in his principle of Anticipations of Perception the
problem that Galileo, Leibniz and Newton had tried to answer mathemati-
cally when they introduced a new type of quantities, namely, infinitesimally
small quantities.
I cannot enter into the details here of this highly obscure book and
its tormented reception, which I have described elsewhere (Giovanelli
2016). What I would like to emphasize is that Cohen explicitly recognized
that it was Stadler’s critique of a possible psychophysical reading of Kant’s
Anticipations of Perception that changed his mind: to understand “what was
new and valuable in Kant’s conception of the intensive magnitude,” Cohen
wrote, it was necessary to become aware of “the deficiencies in its foundation
and presentation, which A. Stadler had first emphasized” (Cohen 1883,
p. 105). Stadler showed the failure of psychophysics’ attempt to present
the intensive magnitude of sensation as the differential dγ (Cohen 1883,
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pp. 159–60).4 Cohen, however, at the turn of the 1880s, must have come to
realize that what psychophysics had failed to achieve in the case of sensation
could still be established on another basis. The intensive magnitude of sen-
sation was not at stake in Kant’s Anticipations of Perception, but rather the
intensive magnitude of physical determinations such as velocity. It was in the
attempt to give a mathematical counterpart to the intensive magnitude of
velocity that the differential was introduced. Kant’s principle was the philo-
sophical expression of this historical fact.
The passage from one interpretative framework to the other seems to be
based more on an association of ideas than on a proper argument. However,
the role played by the discussion of psychophysics is confirmed by Cohen’s
own reconstruction of the path that led him to rethink the interpretation
of Kant’s second principle in the revised and greatly augmented edition of
his Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Cohen 1885), which was finished in August
1885. Cohen recalls that “[i]n the first edition of this book” (cf. Cohen
1871, p. 46), he had attempted to identify the real that corresponds to
sensation with “the ‘unity of stimulus, in which we objectify sensation’”
(1885, p. 436). However, he now recognized that “this expression, although
useful to encourage further reflections, was too psychological to be main-
tained” (1885, p. 436). What is at stake is not “the unit of stimulus,” but
the “the unit of motion” (1885, p. 436). It is precisely in those passages
mentioned by Stadler that Kant, by establishing a relation between reality,
intensive magnitude, and the mathematical/physical concept of moment,
expresses the very problem that the discoverers of the infinitesimal calculus
had to solve to make motion an object of scientific inquiry: “Consequently
Galilei and Leibniz talk of the infinitely small as an intensive magnitude”
(Cohen 1885, p. 427). Kant, Cohen claims, does not even have to emphasize
this connection since it was obvious to his readers (Cohen 1883, p. 105).
Again Cohen recognized that it was Stadler’s work on psychophysics
that led him to completely rethink his own interpretation of the Antici-
pations of Perception. In Cohen’s words, Stadler “rightly opposes the con-
tinuity of sensation as an a priori determination” (Cohen 1885, p. 437).
Not only is there no pure transcendental foundation for the continuity
of sensation; Stadler also demonstrated that empirical studies on the psy-
chology of sensation are even less capable of demonstrating a posteriori
that sensation grows in a continuous way. However, Stadler “only looks
for the pure transcendental foundation he is missing in the sensation”
(Cohen 1885, p. 437). He did not realize that “the ‘pure transcendental
4. See cf. Heidelberger [1993] 2004, p. 222 for more on Cohen’s critique of psycho-
physics in Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode. In my perspective, the interesting part of the
story is the role psychophysics played in Cohen’s work before this book was written.
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foundation’” he was looking for cannot be found “in the sensation, but
only for the sensation” (Cohen 1885, p. 437; my emphasis). That transcen-
dental ground should be found “in the new and autonomous mode of mag-
nitude, which in the infinitesimal method reveals itself to be fruitful for
the constitution of the object in his mechanical meaning” (Cohen 1885,
p. 437). In other words, Stadler still thought that psychophysics offered
the conceptual framework for understanding the problem Kant was facing.
According to Cohen, however, this framework was inadequate for under-
standing Kant’s concept of the “intensive”: “the so-called intensity of sensa-
tion must absolutely be distinct from the intensive magnitude or reality of sensation”
(1883, p. 156).
Elsas, in his 1885 review of Stadler’s 1883 book (1885b), points out
clearly where Stadler was no longer in accordance with Cohen’s new ap-
proach to Kant’s second principle. Stadler considered “motion as the stim-
ulus of sensation” (1885b, p. 146); according to Elsas, however—even if
there is some textual evidence to apply this psychological interpretation
to Kant—the central point is different: transcendental philosophy should
try to explain what makes general mechanics a science and thus what
makes motion a legitimate object of scientific inquiry: “The task is to
explain the fact of science, the fact of general mechanics” (1885b, p. 146).
The relation between motion and sensation is philosophically secondary,
if not irrelevant. “Maybe the author should have further developed the
concept of intensive magnitude and its relation to the category of reality”
(1885b, p. 146); “the elementary concepts of mechanics,” Elsas continues
alluding to Cohen’s work, “already offer some indication in this direction”
(1885b, p. 146).
5. The Dissolution of the Cohen Circle
Stadler’s publication rate fell drastically in the ensuing years, possibly for
health reasons, and we do not have textual evidence of his possible counter-
objections. However, we know that he never agreed with Cohen’s new
course, even if he himself unwittingly had brought it about; their friend-
ship, however, never suffered (Cohen 1910a). Elsas continued to publish,
as a physicist (Elsas 1883b, 1885a, 1886c, 1887), a reviewer of philo-
sophical publications (1884, 1885b) and as a high quality science popu-
larizer (1886a). Moreover, after Fechner’s 1882 Revision der Hauptpuncte der
Psychophysik (1882), Elsas returned to psychophysics; in 1886 he published
his philosophical reflections on the topic in a little pamphlet, Über die
Psychophysik (1886b). Elsas continued the early Marburg debate on
the measurability of sensation and at the same time made some timid
attempts to integrate it into the new approach taken by Cohen in his
1883 monograph.
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5.1. Elsas ’ Über die Psychophysik
Elsas organized his book around two questions: 1. “Are Fechner’s measur-
ing formulas mathematically and physically correct and derived from the
data?” (Elsas 1886b, p. VI). 2. “Is psychophysics in the sense of Fechner
possible in general?” (1886b, p. VI). Elsas answered both these questions
with a resounding “no.” In this sense Elsas was more radical than both
Stadler and Müller. In the language introduced by the latter, he intended
to criticize both the problem and axiom of psychophysics. In what follows,
for reasons of brevity I will concentrate on the third and final part of the
book, in which Elsas dealt with question 2., which is of course the one
richer in philosophical implications (see also Heidelberger [1993] 2004,
p. 229ff ).
After a long digression on du Bois-Reymond’s (1882) theory of quantity
(Elsas 1886b, pp. 50–61; cf. Darrigol 2003, p. 540)—Elsas argued against
the very possibility of measuring the sensation via its functional relation
with the stimulus. Elsas defined the concept of function as the production
of quantity from other quantities. For instance, the area of a triangle is a
function of two variables, base and altitude (Elsas 1886b, p. 61). However,
something different is meant when one says that, according to Ohm’s law,
the current through a conductor between two points is a function of the
voltage across the two points and a constant of proportionality, the resis-
tance (Bois-Reymond 1882). According to Elsas, in the latter case we as-
sume, at least implicitly, that there is a causal connection that serves as the
basis of the functional relationship (Elsas 1886b, p. 61; cf. Heidelberger
2010). The volume of Knallgas or oxyhydrogen that can be produced by
water electrolysis in a given amount of time measures the electric current
because the current causes the electrolysis; or, to take a simpler example,
the thermometer measures temperature because equal temperature differ-
ences cause equal expansions of the mercury column, etc.
No such causal connection can be found between stimulus and sensa-
tion. Thus, Fechner has no real reason to claim that equal difference
sensations are proportional to equal sensation differences. The question
is not merely epistemological; Elsas showed that, without having a causal
connection as a guide, it is easy to lose grasp of the mathematical deri-
vation. Let’s grant Fechner that his “constant k has the same meaning as
the practical measuring unit for sensation” (Elsas 1886b, p. 17); then
inconsistencies arise in his system of formulae. According to eq. (ii), k
is the value of the sensation difference Δγ that corresponds to Δβ:β = 1,
that is, to a doubling of the initial stimulus β; according to eq. (v), k is
the value of the sensation difference Δγ that corresponds to β = e, where e
is the base of the natural logarithm (the natural logarithm of e is 1);
according to eq. (vii), Δγ = k when β0:β = 1:e (the natural logarithm of 1
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is 0).5 Thus, without an underlying causal connection, a mere functional
relation is not sufficient to establish a quantitative comparison.
It is true that, as Fechner points out, even in physics a functional rela-
tionship does not always imply a causal relationship (Fechner 1882,
p. 227); the frequency of a pendulum is a function of the pendulum’s
length, the orbital velocity of a planet of its distance from the sun, etc.;
however, no causal relationship between these pair of quantities is im-
plied (Elsas 1886b, p. 65). However, according to Elsas, at a deeper level,
there must always be “a causal condition at the basis of the functional con-
nection” (1886b, p. 65); in the cases just mentioned, it is the gravitational
force (cf. Heidelberger [1993] 2004, p. 230ff ). Thus there are only two
alternatives. If, as Fechner claims, there is no causal relationship between
the body and the mind, then the connection between stimulus and sen-
sation cannot be expressed through a mathematical equation; the latter is
not measurable. What Fechner constructed is only “pseudo-physics
[Scheinphysik]” (Elsas 1886b, p. 67). If Weber’s law were really an ex-
pression of the causal connection between stimulus and sensation, then
Fechner’s psychophysics would be a “real physics of the soul” (Elsas 1886b,
p. 64). However, the existence of a causal relationship between stimulus
and sensation, the body and soul, seems to be incompatible with energy
conservation.
Thus, Elsas did not seem to allow for any appeal against his draconian
statement: “Mathematical psychology, psychophysics and physiological
psychology—three absurd expressions [Bezeichnungen]!” (Elsas 1886b,
p. 79). The only escape, in Elsas’ view—as Stadler had already suggested
(Stadler 1878, p. 223; cf. Elsas 1886b, p. 74n20)—is to consider the
causal relationship not between stimulus and sensation, but between
stimulus and the peripheral/central nervous system: “then psychophysics
becomes nothing but common physiology” (Elsas 1886b). As Elsas put
it in the opening of a contemporary semi-popular introduction to acoustics,
“[t]he object of sensations is always motion, which is transmitted to the
nerves of our sense organs and through them is transported to our brain”
(1886a, p. 1). We can say that hearing is different from sight, but we are
not able to express in words this difference between sound and color. The
only difference is in the types of motion that excite our sense organs; this
difference is investigated by physics, “the task of which is to reduce the
natural phenomena to motion” (1886a, p. 1). If one cannot make use of
the concepts of force and motion, Elsas concludes rather narrow-mindedly,
then no mathematics can be applied (1886b, p. 70). Sensation is not an
object of scientific knowledge; it is not a part of nature; it has no reality
5. Recall that eq. (vii) is derived from γ0 − γ = klogβ0 − logβ.
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for the mathematical physicist; it cannot be treated mathematically as a
measurable quantity (Elsas 1886b, p. 70).
5.2. With or Against Cohen
The role of sensation, Elsas concluded in his book, is epistemological.
Sensation expresses the need to go beyond measurable extended quantities,
to look at that something which is extended, and provides physical content
to extension. This is, in Cohen’s interpretation, what Kant had tried to
express in the Anticipations of Perception, by connecting sensation, reality
and intensive magnitude (Elsas 1886b, pp. 75f ). E.g., as Elsas put it,
velocity as a physical concept cannot be reduced to the differential quotient
of space and time: it “is an intensive magnitude; the extensive quotient is
only the mathematical expression of it but not an adequate one” (1886b,
p. 68). In this way Elsas attempted to rephrase Cohen’s infamously obscure
prose in a language more familiar to science practitioners: “At least I hope
that I have not changed something essential in this translation from the
scholastic language of the philosophers into the one of the physicists” (Elsas
1886b, p. 76).
These remarks seem to be tacked on at the end of the book, rather than
part of its main line of argument.6 However, they show that, in contrast to
Stadler, Elsas had at least tried to embrace Cohen’s new course. This was far
from obvious. In contrast, Müller’s attitude towards Cohen’s work dramat-
ically changed after the latter’s 1883 book. In his 1886 habilitation writing,
Das Problem der Continuität imMathematik und Mechanik (Müller 1886), Müller
became highly critical of Cohen’s connection of the differential and the
intensive magnitude. Interestingly, according to Müller, the “difficulties
which Cohen got tangled up in the development of his thought” should
be traced to the fact that he was misled by the analogy with psychophysics.
Cohen, in Müller’s view, “committed the same mistake that psycho-physics
fell into” (1886, p. 96n.); he attributed “to something which, like the differ-
ential, is not a real object […], a magnitude, indeed an intensive magnitude”
(1886, p. 96n). Müller’s remark is important insofar as it confirms that
Cohen, more or less consciously, tried to transfer the approach that psycho-
physics had applied to the intensive magnitude of psychological quantities to
the intensive magnitude of physical ones. Just as psychophysics wanted to
6. I disagree with Heidelberger’s claim that Elsas “associates this [his critique of psy-
chophysics] with Cohen’s theory of infinitesimals” (Heidelberger [1993] 2004, p. 230). I
suspect that Elsas’s emphasis on “role that causality plays in measurement” (Heidelberger
[1993] 2004, p. 229) was formulated before (possibly already in the answer to the 1881
Preisaufgabe) and independently from Cohen’s 1883 book; only as an afterthought Elsas
tried to give some Cohenian flavor to his line of argument.
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measure sensation as the accumulation of infinitesimally small sensation in-
crements, Cohen wanted to present the production of finite quantities in
physics as the infinite summation of infinitesimal quantities. However, as
Müller pointed out, this is “a complete misunderstanding of the method of
limits” (1886, p. 96n).
Müller’s attacks, who “for some years was part of our restricted circle,”
came as a surprise (Elsas to Lasswitz, January 7, 1887; CN, Br. 11, 171). Elsas
pointed this out in a letter to Kurd Lasswitz at the beginning of 1887, when
he thanked the latter for the positive review (Lasswitz 1887a) of his psycho-
physics booklet in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung—Germany’s most important
general review journal. Elsas did not want to influence Lasswitz’s judgment,
whom Natorp had asked to review Müller’s book for the Philosophische
Monatshefte (Natorp to Lasswitz, September 24, 1886; CN, Br. 10, 170).
However, he did not hide his disappointment towards Müller’s behavior, after
all Cohen had done for him (Elsas to Lasswitz, January 7, 1887; CN,Br. 11, 171).
Nevertheless, he also had to admit the difficulties of fully embracing Cohen’s
approach: “Often I myself am not sure if Cohen really means and says what I
read off or hear from his elliptic remarks” (Elsas to Lasswitz, January 7, 1887;
CN, Br. 11, 172). Elsas expressed a similar uneasiness a month later in
another letter to Lasswitz (Elsas to Lasswitz, Febuary 8, 1887; CN, Br. 12, 182).
Lasswitz (1848–1910) was a high school teacher from Gotha who was
working on the history and philosophy of atomism (Lasswitz 1878, 1884).
He became interested in Cohen’s work on the history of the infinitesimal
calculus (Lasswitz 1885a, 1885b), possibly after a correspondence (Eccarius
1985) with one of Cohen’s most renowned mathematician critics, Georg
Cantor (Cantor 1884). Lasswitz’s review of Müller’s book became a long
paper entitled “Das Problem der Continuität” (Lasswitz 1888). Besides
addressing some of Müller’s criticisms (Lasswitz 1888, pp. 24–8; see also
Lasswitz 1887b), Lasswitz mostly gave his take on Cohen’s connection
between the differential and intensive magnitudes. Motion, he explained,
as a change of space extension in a certain time span, has no physical reality.
In every instant, there is no change of position, thus no motion. The physical
reality of motion has to be searched for in something that is beyond extension,
but possesses a greater or smaller ability to generate a determinate motion
(Lasswitz 1888, p. 19ff ). However, this intensity of motion finds mathe-
matical expression in the differential function dy = f0(dx), and not in the dif-
ferential dx, as Cohen misleadingly claimed (Lasswitz 1888, pp. 29–31). Yet
Müller remained unconvinced. He replied to Lasswitz in October 1887, call-
ing Cohen’s work on the infinitesimal method “one of the most monstrous
births in the entire history of philosophy” (Müller to Lasswitz, Octtober 26,
1887; CN, Br. 13, 172). Müller died a few months later of a severe lung dis-
ease, so that no further discussion was possible.
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5.3. The Fechner-Elsas Debate
Toward the end of 1887, Elsas sent Lasswitz detailed comments on the
latter’s “essay on the problem of continuity” (Elsas to Lasswitz, Nov. 9,
1887; CN, Br. 14, 179). He also took the opportunity to announce that
he had finished another paper on psychophysics for the Philosophische
Monatshefte: “Even though I’m very busy with accumulators and galva-
nometers, I did not want to hesitate too long in answering Fechner’s paper
in the Philos. Studien” (Elsas to Lasswitz, Nov. 9, 1887; CN, Br. 14, 182).
In fact, the indefatigable Fechner again made the effort to answer some of
his critics, Elsas himself and Alfred Köhler (1886), in Wilhelm Wundt’s
journal (Fechner 1888), which in spite of the title, mainly dealt with em-
pirical psychology. Fechner was 86 years old, and as he recognized half-
jokingly, this may have been the last time that he was able to defend his
own scientific creature (Fechner 1888, p. 163).
Fechner’s reply to Elsas is too long and detailed to be dealt with here.
However, a point is worth noticing. Here Fechner repeated, even more
clearly than in Müller’s review, that the assumption that difference sen-
sations are proportional to sensation differences was merely the “simplest
hypothesis” (Fechner 1888, pp. 171, 174) from which he could choose
(cf. also Fechner 1888, pp. 147ff for more details). Fechner calls it the
Unterschiedshypothese, the difference hypothesis ( j.n.d.s are proportional to
sensation differences). Such a hypothesis is acceptable inasmuch as it is im-
plied by the empirically confirmed logarithmic law. Fechner claims that
there is at least one other simple alternative one can think of, which he
calls the Verhältnishypothese, the ratio hypothesis (j.n.d.s are proportional
to sensation ratios). This hypothesis, which was adopted by Plateau and
Brentano (and supported by Elsas himself ), leads however to a power law
which, Fechner claimed, is empirically wrong (but see of course Stevens
1961).
However, Fechner had to concede Elsas’ point that, if one assumes the
difference hypothesis, eqs. (ii), (v) and (vii) are indeed incompatible “as
the author [Elsas] has correctly shown on p. 17” (Fechner 1888, p. 167).
However, Fechner had a quite interesting response. He claimed that the
proportionality between sensation differences and difference sensations
applies only to the differential equation (iii), and not to the finite equation
(ii), an equation that he actually never wrote: “where for God’s sake did I
ever put forward equation [ii]?” (Fechner 1888, p. 168). Thus, in the reply
to Elsas, Fechner may have revealed a quite astonishing fact, which, Neo-
Kantianism aside, is relevant to Fechner scholarship in general (cf. Scheerer
1987). Fechner did not regard eq. (iii) as an approximation derived from the
empirically verified eq. (ii), but vice versa: he saw eq. (ii) as the approxima-
tion of the exact eq. (iii) (cf. Dzhafarov and Colonius 1999). After all, this is
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confirmed by the fact that, in the Zend-Avesta, he had introduced the dif-
ferential equation as an exact equation before he knew about Weber’s find-
ings (Fechner 1851). Thus Fechner’s rebuttal to Elsas reveals that, in
contrast to what most of Fechner’s critics had assumed, the passage from
Weber’s law (ii) to the differential equation (iii) via the infamous mathe-
matical auxiliary principle was not the spine of Fechner’s derivation of
the logarithmic formula.
In his reply, Elsas (1888a) had to admit that he could not find eq. (ii) in
any of Fechner’s writings (Elsas 1888a, p. 132n1). However, he was not
particularly impressed. Even if I cannot do full justice of Elsas’ thirty-page
defense here, I suspect that he did not fully realize the importance of
Fechner’s counter-move. Elsas went on to criticize Fechner’s derivation
starting from a more general finite formula, again attacking the mathemat-
ical auxiliary principle, that, he claimed, Fechner used more as the wand of
a magician rather than the tool of a craftsman (Elsas 1888a, p. 134). Elsas
showed that one can actually obtain the logarithmic equation (vii) without
magically deriving it from the finite formula via the auxiliary principle. In
this setting, the proportionality factor k becomes something that has to be
obtained by differentiation of the logarithmic equation (v) and not intro-
duced from the outset in Weber’s eq. (ii) (Elsas 1888a, p. 136). Thus, the
proportionality between j.n. difference sensations and sensation differences
is strictly valid only “when the change of [γ] and [β] are infinitesimally
small” (Elsas 1888a, p. 137). This, however, might have been the exact
point Fechner wanted to make. The constant k is derived from the loga-
rithmic law and not taken from the empirical Weber law. It is the loga-
rithmic law itself, taken as measurement formula that defines the relation
between two units of measure (Heidelberger [1993] 2004, p. 206). Elsas
did not seem to realize that this might have fended off many neo-Kantian
objections.
However, for Elsas, the essential philosophical point has not changed.
Let’s concede to Fechner that the number of sensation differences becomes
approximately proportional to the number of difference sensations, the
smaller the stimuli difference becomes. Still, Fechner uncritically assumed
that one can measure sensation by adding up sensation differences. How-
ever, it is far from obvious that sensation has such an additive structure
(Elsas 1888a, p. 139ff ). Musical intervals are certainly quantitatively com-
parable (a 4th is smaller than a 5th), but cannot be meaningfully added (a
5th plus a 4th equals an octave) (Elsas 1888a, p. 140). Fechner, Elsas
points out, wants us to believe that sensation is “something spiritual, psy-
chical, and nevertheless has magnitude that can be connected additively
with other magnitudes of the same types”; but Elsas simply could not under-
stand this: “[f]undamental epistemological views prevent me from doing so”
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(1888a, p. 143). The epistemological difference between Fechner and Elsas,
I think, boils down to the following: the transformation of a class of inten-
sities into a class of measurable intensities was for Fechner a matter of defi-
nition, whereas for Elsas it was a matter of physics. Thus, for Fechner the
difference hypothesis was a better definition than the alternative, whereas
Elsas spent the rest of the paper trying to prove that the ratio hypothesis
was physically superior.
When Elsas’ rebuttal appeared in the 1888 issue of the Philosophische
Monatshefte, Fechner had already passed away. “The previous remarks,”
Elsas acknowledged in a short postscript to his paper, “are no laurel wreath
and no palm branches worth being placed on Fechner’s fresh grave”
(1888a, p. 155). They were written as Fechner was still alive and still
speak as if he were alive, “since Fechner’s contribution to science will never
die” (1888a, p. 155). Elsas’ note was not simply rhetorical. In the same year,
Elsas dedicated a long homage to the great scientist in the national-liberal
magazineDie Grenzboten (1888b). Granting Fechner the honors of war, Elsas
now celebrated Fechner’s work as the first serious critical reflection on the
measurability of mental contents (cf. 1888a, p. 114). However, Elsas’ con-
ciliatory remarks could not and probably were not meant to bridge the wide
philosophical divide that separated him from Fechner. For Fechner, mea-
suring sensations was a worthy enterprise, because as Heidelberger has
pointed out, he ultimately conceived of physical measurement itself as
nothing but the refinement of the resolution power of sensations via mea-
suring apparatuses (Heidelberger [1993] 2004, sec. 6.5 and in particular
pp. 246); but this point of view was fundamentally foreign to Elsas,
who, like most 19th century physicists, regarded sensations as nothing
but anthropomorphic slags that physical measurement was meant to get
rid of.
6. Conclusion: From the Cohen Circle to the Marburg School
In those years, the Marburg critique of scientific psychology was taking a
more philosophically sophisticated form in Natorp’s hands (Natorp 1887,
1888, 1893; cf. Luft 2009); Elsas’ technical objections against psycho-
physics were largely forgotten. They are mentioned, albeit rarely, in the his-
torical literature on psychophysics and measurement theory (Heidelberger
[1993] 2004; Darrigol 2003), though, surprisingly, never in the literature
on Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Yet Elsas’ work on the topic was respected
in the scientific community. Beside Fechner’s own detailed reply, Elsas’
booklet deserved the mention (alongside Paul du Bois-Reymond’s Allgemeine
Functionentheorie [Bois-Reymond 1882]) of his teacher Helmholtz in his 1887
paper, Zählen und Messen (Helmholtz 1887). The reference to Elsas reveals
that Helmholtz’s paper—which is now regarded as a classic contribution
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to the philosophical/mathematical reflection on the notion of measure-
ment in science (Darrigol 2003)—was probably occasioned by the ques-
tion of the measurability of sensation (Heidelberger 1993). Thus, the
publications of the early Cohen circle were perceived as contributions to
this debate. By contrast, Cohen’s commentaries on Helmholtz’s 1887 paper
(Cohen 1888)—which appeared in the same 1888 volume of the Philosophische
Monatshefte as Elsas’ rebuttal to Fechner—give the impression that he did not
fully recognize the philosophical importance of the issue at stake. Elsas’ causal
theory of measurement is not even mentioned; most of all, Cohen, intent on
attacking Helmholtz’s naive empiricism, does not seem to appreciate the im-
plications of the latter’s analysis of the conditions governing extensive magni-
tudes; similarly he quickly passed over Helmholtz’s definition of intensive
magnitude as coefficients (measurable only as ratios between extensive mag-
nitudes) (Helmholtz 1887, p. 47). Instead, Cohen concluded the paper by
plugging his own work on the intensive magnitude as infinitesimals (Cohen
1888, p. 273), which seems rather out of context.
In the following years, Elsas, a close friend of Heinrich Hertz (Fölsing
1997, p. 423), published extensively on the new Maxwell-Hertz theory; he
introduced an autonomous circuit breaker, alternative to the Wagner
hammer (Elsas 1889b), suggested methods to measure electric resistance
(Elsas 1891c) and the dielectric constants (Elsas 1891b), etc. However—
despite Hertz’s advice not to go astray “in swampy borderlands” like psy-
chophysics (Hertz to Elsas, February 10, 1889; cited in Fölsing 1997,
p. 423)—he did not forgo some interesting philosophical escapades (Elsas
1889a). After Hertz failed to find a position for him in Bonn (Fölsing 1997,
pp. 429), he became an extraordinary professor without salary in Marburg. In a
difficult financial situation (Lasswitz toNatorp, June 4, 1895; cited inHolzhey
1986, p. 24n89), he died prematurely in 1895 of pulmonary tuberculosis.
Cohen’s funeral oration (Cohen 1895) in his honor is also a recollection
of the interdisciplinary atmosphere of the early Marburg circle. If it was
Cohen’s early interest in psychophysics that contributed to gathering this
small group around his Marburg chair, it was Cohen’s infinitesimal turn
that had fragmented and eventually dissolved this group. It was not just
the traitor Müller that did not follow Cohen’s approach, but also the sincere
friend Stadler—since 1892 a professor at the ETH Zurich (Beller 2000)—;
Elsas attempted to translate it for non-philosophically-trained readers, but
ultimately he was himself not fully convinced. It was the newcomer Lasswitz,
though never an official member of the Marburg group, who was the first
to try to implement a watered-down version of Cohen’s connection between
the intensive and infinitesimal in his own successful work as a historian of
science (Lasswitz 1890; see Natorp 1891; Elsas 1891a), even if his efforts were
not to Cohen’s complete satisfaction (Cohen 1896, p. XLVII).
314 Sensation and Stimulus
Precisely this combination of transcendental philosophy and history of sci-
ence became the trademark of the Marburg community at the turn of century.
At the end of 1890s—after Natorp became full professor—Cohen started to
talk cautiously of a little school that was forming inMarburg (Cohen toNatorp,
April 19, 1897; CN, Br. 42, 243 and Cohen to Althoff, May 8, 1897; CN,
Br. 43, 244). The titles of the Preisaufgaben launched in those years testify to
the historical interests that dominated this group: Aristotle and mathematics
in 1894/95 (Albert Görland), Leibniz’s foundation of mathematics and natural
science in 1896/97 (Ernst Cassirer), Galileo’s Mechanics in 1900/1901 (Enrico
DePortu), and Faraday’s concept of matter in 1901/1903 (Otto Buek) (cf.
Holzhey 1986, vol. 1, p. 382). The prize essays were transformed into often
excellent dissertations and monographs (Görland 1899; Cassirer 1902; Portu
1904; Buek 1904) which represent some early examples of the Marburg-style
integration of history of philosophy and history of science which soon found
its most successful expression in Cassirer’s Erkenntnisproblem (Cassirer 1906a).
The interests in psychophysics—the attempt “to make sensation arise
and increase till it comes to consciousness and becomes integral” (Cohen
1902, p. 441)—faded in the background. However, interestingly, it did not
completely disappear. The Preisaufgabe suggested by Natorp in 1904/1906
concerned the problem of sensation in modern psychology. The prize re-
mained unassigned. However, in 1906 Johannes Paulsen finished a disser-
tation on Fechner’s concept of sensation under the guidance of Cohen and
Natorp (Paulsen 1906–1907). A longer version of it was published as a
booklet (Paulsen 1907) in the first volume of the Philosophische Arbeiten,
the series edited by Cohen and Natorp that was meant to represent (Cassirer
1906b, pp. I–III) what people began to call the Marburg school (cf. Cohen
1913–1914). Even if Paulsen’s work does not add anything new to the pre-
vious neo-Kantian criticisms of psychophysics (see also Natorp 1912a), it
shows that the issue was still considered part of the legacy of the Marburg
community. After all, as Cohen himself recognized in his Nachruf for
Stadler, it was the latter’s critique of Fechner’s logarithmic formula that
led him to take a new course in his 1883 book (Cohen 1910a). It is probably
not just by chance that a contribution of Paulsen’s (1912) was included in
the 1912 Festshrift for Cohen’s seventieth birthday, testifying to the role
that psychophysics played in the evolution of the latter’s thought.
As we mentioned at the opening of the present paper, this was precisely
what Cassirer suggested in his article (Cassirer 1912) for the 1912 special
issue of the Kant-Studien that was prepared for the celebration of Cohen’s
retirement. Cohen’s interest in the problem of sensation in Kant’s Anticipa-
tions of Perception, Cassirer explained, led to the notion of stimulus as ob-
jectified sensation; the latter in turn must be ultimately thought of as a
motion. It was the question of the possibility of motion as an object of
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scientific knowledge that ultimately led to Cohen’s interest in the history of
the infinitesimal method (Cassirer 1912, p. 260). Cohen’s Das Princip der
Infinitesimal-Methode, despite being unsuccessful as a scholarly work on the
infinitesimal calculus, exemplified that peculiar amalgam of history and phi-
losophy of science that became one of the trademarks of the Marburg school
(cf. Giovanelli 2016). However, as we have tried to show, the appearance of
that book also interrupted a fruitful discussion on measurability in science
that the Cohen circle had initiated. This discussion seems to have left no trace
in the major Marburg contributions to philosophy of science (Cassirer 1910;
Natorp 1910). It was only in the 1930s, that Cassirer returned, although
briefly, to the issue of measurement in physics in his “Determinismus und
Indeterminismus” (Cassirer 1936). However, he could resume the discussion
from the exact point where the 19th century had left it: physical measure-
ment, Cassirer insisted, is not simply the emancipation of sensation from the
limits imposed by “the fundamental psychophysical law”, “the Fechner-
Weber law” (Cassirer 1936, p. 42; trans. 1956, p. 32) by means of measuring
apparatuses. The physical world, Cassirer claimed, is not a mere quantitative
refinement of the sensible world; it is a qualitatively different world, a world
of shadows, a symbolic construction that takes the place of the fullness and
color of the sensible world (Cassirer 1936, p. 41; trans. 1956, p. 43).
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